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Abstract
This paper explores the prevelance and impact of performance pay using a representative panel of
workers in the United States. Previous research has found that at the ￿rm level there evidence that
individuals alter their behavior in response to performance pay. However, as Lazear (1986) observes,
performance pay is predicted to result in high ability worker￿ s self-selecting into performance pay jobs.
It is not know if performance pay itself results in better labor market outcomes for the average worker.
We use the panel aspect of the PSID to show that workers who move for a standard wage job to
performance pay have higher income and more job stability. In addition, we ￿nd that there has been a
secular increase in the use of performance pay, likely due technical change and improvements in
measuring worker performance.
11 Introduction
It is an article of faith in economics that individuals respond to incentives. What is more controversial is
whether or not the introduction of performance pay enhances labor market performance. As Steven Kerr
(1975) has observed, despite the best of intentions, performance pay system can often be counter
productive. These concerns are re￿ ected in the 1991 National Research Council Study that concludes that
￿the evidence is insu¢ cient, however, to determine conclusively whether merit pay can enhance individual
performance or allow to make comparative statements about merit and variable pay plans.￿The purpose of
this paper is to present evidence on the e¢ ciency consequence of performance pay for using representative
panels of US workers. By comparing how workers fare when they switch from performance pay to
non-performance pay job, and vice-versa, we are able evaluate the consequence of performance pay for
income and job stability.
Our main ￿ndings are as follows. First, compensation in performance pay jobs is more variable, and hence
in a downturn workers in such jobs have lower wages compared to workers in jobs with no performance pay.
Consistent with economic intuition, we also ￿nd that hours are less sensitive to business cycle ￿ uctuations
in performance pay jobs, and hence workers in such jobs work more hours per year, and have longer job
tenure.
Azariadis (1975) and Baily (1974) suggest that one reason wages are insensitive to business cycle
￿ uctuations is that workers are risk averse, and prefer to have more stable income in exchange for lower
average wages. Among employed workers we ￿nd that there is little di⁄erence in yearly income inequality
between performance pay and non-performance pay jobs. Moreover, once layo⁄ risk is included, we ￿nd
that workers in performance pay jobs have signi￿cantly less income inequality compared to workers with
more traditional compensation. Hence, consistent with earlier evidence on nominal wage rigidities, the
insurance model of Azariadis (1975) and Baily (1974) does not appear to be consistent with the data.
Rather, we ￿nd that performance pay jobs deliver more in terms of both higher incomes, longer job tenure,
and hence over all better labor market performance.
This result begs the question of why in a competitive market we do not observe all ￿rms moving to
performance pay? One reason is that the decision to implement a performance pay system trades o⁄ the
bene￿ts against the costs, which in turn depends upon the characteristics of the job. Using Bureau of
Labor Statistics data Brown (1990) ￿nds evidence supporting this hypothesis, and also shows that the
incidence of performance pay varies with job characteristics. MacLeod and Parent (1999) extend these
results to control for worker selection using the NLSY (National Longitudinal Survey of Youth) and the
PSID (Panel Study of Income Dynamics). They follow individual workers over job changes, and ￿nd that
job characteristics are an important determinant of whether or not the ￿rm uses pay for performance, that
is independent of worker characteristics. The agenda of the paper is as a follows. The next section provides
a brief (and incomplete) review of the literature on performance pay. Section 3 introduces a model that
illustrates how performance pay can labor market performance. The data is discussed in section 4, with the
2results presented in section 5.
2 Literature
The central question in the theory of incentives is not so much whether or not individuals respond to
rewards and punishments (they do), but rather how best to design rewards as a function of the available
performance measures. The early sociology literature has shown that whether or not one should use group
or individual incentives depends upon the extent to which employee outputs are complements or
substitutes (see Schmitt (1981) for a review). The management literature has explored many aspects of
performance appraisal, and has found that good performance evaluation is a complex and expensive
activity. In their review of this literature, Bretz, Milkovich, and Read (1992) conclude that
￿...organizations continue to undermine the e⁄ectiveness of the appraisal system. Little time is
spend on the appraisal system; raters are not systematically trained and are not held
accountable.￿
Consequently, performance evaluation should be viewed as part of the technology, that varies from ￿rm to
￿rm and over time. This observation is important in our work because it implies that ￿rms will vary in
their practices, and with performance pay varying with the characteristics of the job.
The economics literature on performance pay has approached the problem from both the individual and
the job design perspective. Lazear (1986) focuses upon the selection consequences of performance pay.
With a ￿xed pay system, employees face a ￿xed standard to ensure continued employment, resulting in
more homogeneity in performance across jobs. Performance pay allows workers who have a preference to
work hard (or less) that the norm to select an appropriate level of e⁄ort. Lazear (2000) explores the impact
of introducing a piece rate compensation at a auto glass installation company, and ￿nds much of the
enhanced productivity gains arise from the selection of more productive workers into installation positions.
If the goal of a compensation system is merely one of selection, then absent an experiment, it would be
very di¢ cult to determine the causal e⁄ect on performance pay on economic performance. For example, if
the variance of worker ability in a population increases, then we would expect this to lead to more use of
performance pay. In this case any relationship between performance pay and economic performance is
merely a re￿ ection of the underlying variation in employee characteristics, and not a consequence of
performance pay per se.
We do know from occupation studies that individuals do respond changes in rewards. Shearer (2004) ￿nds
that tree British Columbia respond to changes in the piece rate, while Nagin, Rebitzer, Sanders, and
Taylor (2002) ￿nd that call center employees vary their behavior as a function of the level of monitoring by
the employer. For highly paid individuals, Chevalier and Ellison (1997) ￿nd that mutual fund managers
investment behavior is a⁄ect that the structure of their end of the year bonus pay, while Gibbons and
Murphy (1992) ￿nd that ￿rms use more explicit incentives to compensate CEO towards the end of their
careers.
Given that these studies illustrate the role of incentive pay only for speci￿c occupations, we cannot
conclude that performance pay is important for the economy as a whole. Our empirical work builds upon
3Brown (1990) and MacLeod and Parent (1999) who show that holding worker ability ￿xed, compensation
varies with job characteristics. This is consistent with the theoretical models of Baker (1992) and
Holmstr￿m and Milgrom (1991). Recent work, such as Black and Lynch (2001) and Bresnahan,
Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002), has begun to document the changes in work practices that are occurring in
response to increased use of information technologies. Both of these studies use establishment data, making
it di¢ cult to control for endogenous matching between workers and ￿rms. Our approach builds upon
identifying the e⁄ect of compensation by following the same worker through di⁄erent jobs. In the next
section we develop an illustrative model that links characteristics of the monitoring system to worker
performance and job tenure holding worker ability ￿xed to generate predictions on how merit pay should
e⁄ect overall pay and job tenure.
3 Implications of Contract Theory for Performance Pay
Incidence and Level
In this section we introduce a simple model that illustrates the main empirical results. In practice
compensation is extremely complex, with employee behavior responding to a variety of rewards, including
promotions, career development, future wage growth, market opportunities, piece rates, sales commissions,
tips, on the job non-pecuniary rewards and so one. Regardless of the form that a reward take, a key insight
of contract theory is that rewards are most e⁄ective when they re￿ ect the needs of the ￿rm.
Consider the following simple model of performance pay inspired by Baker (1992) and Holmstr￿m and
Milgrom (1991). Suppose that the worker has a base productivity of ￿ that varies over time. In addition,
the worker can allocate additional e⁄ort, e; to a enhance performance measure P (e): Given that the ￿rm
has di⁄erent information than the worker, it is not always in the best interests of the ￿rm to have the
worker increase the measure P (e): For example, suppose that P represents research output of an
academic. If the University puts all weight on P; and none on teaching, then there will be no teaching. As
long as the performance P is correlated with the goals of the employer, then it will be e¢ cient for them to
use it for purposes of assessing performance pay. As Baker (1992) shows, the extent to which pay depends
upon P is a function of the quality of the signal.
We consider a simple parameterization of this idea that is rich enough to capture the e⁄ects that we
observe in the data. It is assumed that the worker e⁄ort results in a measured output v with probability
￿(e); where ￿0 > 0; ￿00 < 0 and ￿(0) = 0: We introduce the quality of the measurement by letting ￿ be the
probability that v is useful to the ￿rm. It is assumed that this event is independent of the event that
generates v: Both v and ￿ are parameters that can change with time. The former as a result of business
cycle ￿ uctuations, while the latter as a result of improvements in monitoring technology. The pro￿t of the
￿rm at time t is therefore:
￿t = ￿t + ￿t￿(et)vt ￿ it;
where it is the total compensation (income) paid to the worker. The ￿rm is assumed to employ a worker if
and only if pro￿ts are at least zero.
4The additional e⁄ort to produce v costs the worker c(et); where c0;c00 > 0: The utility of the worker is
given by
ut = it ￿ c(et)=￿t;
where ￿t is the ability of the worker. It is assumed that the worker￿ s outside option is given by u0
t; while
the ￿rm hires a worker as long as she obtains at least zero pro￿ts.
It is assumed that ￿0 (0)vt > c0 (0); that is when ￿t = 1 it is always e¢ cient to have positive e⁄ort.
However, since c0 (0) > 0 then for low ￿ it may be e¢ cient to have zero e⁄ort. The e¢ cient e⁄ort level
conditional upon employment e￿
tsatis￿es:
c0 (e￿
t)=￿t
(
= ￿t￿(e￿
t)vt; if e￿
t > 0;
￿ ￿t￿(e￿
t)vt if e￿
t = 0:
(1)
When ￿t is su¢ ciently close to zero, the marginal cost of e⁄ort is larger than the marginal bene￿t, and
hence e⁄ort is zero in those cases.
An e¢ cient compensation package entails the ￿rm paying the worker a bonus bt = vt every time the ￿rm
￿nds the worker￿ s e⁄ort to be useful and productive. In this case, the ￿rm pays a ￿xed wage that makes
the worker indi⁄erent between this job and her next best market alternative:
wt = u0
t ￿ f￿t￿(e￿
t)vt ￿ c(e￿
t)=￿tg: (2)
Thus, the worker is employed if and only if:
￿t = ￿t + ￿t￿(e￿
t)vt ￿ u0
t ￿ 0;
or when
￿t ￿ u0
t ￿ ￿t￿(e￿
t)vt: (3)
The parameters ￿t; ￿t and vt are assumed to be ￿rm speci￿c, while ￿t and u0
t are worker speci￿c
parameters, though in general we should expect ￿t and u0
t to be correlated at both the individual and
aggregate level. Given this, the model has a number of testable implications. From expression (1) there is a
￿ ￿t with the property that for ￿t ￿ ￿ ￿t additional e⁄ort and performance pay is zero. This is a
non-performance pay job. Performance pay jobs are characterized by ￿t > ￿ ￿t: Notice that performance pay
jobs do not pay bonus every period - they do so only in those periods there is output vt and this output is
valued by the ￿rm. This occurs with with probability ￿t￿(et): The empirical implications of the model are
as follows:
1. From expression (1):
(a) If the monitoring technology improves with time, so that ￿t is increasing, this implies that more
￿rms use performance pay.
(b) More able workers receive larger bonuses and more frequent bonuses.
2. From expression (2) we have:
5(a) More able workers get higher wages.
(b) Total compensation is higher in performance pay jobs.
(c) Wages (income less bonus pay) in performance pay jobs are lower than in non-performance pay
jobs. Moreover, the di⁄erence is larger for more able workers.
3. From expression (3) we see that a ￿rm employs a worker if and only if ￿t ￿ ￿ ￿t = u0
t ￿ ￿t￿(e￿
t)vt: If ￿ ￿t
falls there is an increase in employment. In particular, we have that for larger ￿t; the cuto⁄
productivity ￿ ￿t is lower, and therefore the likelihood of a layo⁄ falls. Hence we have:
(a) For two equally productive ￿rms, those with higher ￿t have more employment, and less layo⁄s in
a downturn.
(b) In performance pay jobs, more able workers have a lower likelihood of a layo⁄s in a downturn.
Brown (1992) has found with BLS data that performance pay jobs pay less on average than ￿xed wage
jobs, a result that is inconsistent with prediction 2:b: If we extend the model to a dynamic framework we
can generate Brown￿ s ￿nding as follows. A consequence of performance pay is that turnover is lower on
average, and consequently performance pay employees face lower expected job search costs. Therefore,
￿xed wage workers must be paid a premium to compensate them for the higher turnover risk. If this
premium is large enough, the ￿xed wage workers would earn higher wages while working than performance
pay workers, thought average yearly earning that include the layo⁄ risk would be lower.
Finally, we have assumed that wages are ￿ exible, even though there is evidence that standard wage
contracts are rigid in the short run (see for example Card and Hyslop (1997)). Given that under
performance pay ￿rms adjust bonuses on a yearly basis, this provides extra ￿ exibility relative to ￿xed wage
contracts. Hence, the addition of this feature would merely exacerbate the di⁄erence between performance
pay and rigid wage jobs. If we include an hours decision into the model, then we expect that hours will be
more variable in ￿xed wage jobs. In bonus pay jobs, a downturn would decrease the likelihood that the
worker produced high performance, and hence the ￿rms would be able to correspondingly adjust
compensation. This in turn implies that there will be less adjustment of hours in performance pay jobs
relative to ￿xed wage jobs. Therefore we can conclude that the theory predicts that holding worker ability
￿xed, we should observe a correlation between contract form (performance pay or not), total compensation,
hours worked and job tenure. We now turn the empirical analysis to see if indeed these implications are
consistent with the data.
4 Data
In order to explore the e⁄ect of performance pay we need a panel of employment histories. As a
consequence the bulk of our analysis is conducted using data from the PSID (Panel Study for Income
Dynamics). The main advantage of the PSID is that it provides a representative sample of the workforce
for a relatively long period. A disadvantage of the PSID, however, is that our constructed measures of
performance pay are relatively crude and may be fairly imperfect proxies for whether or not workers are
6paid their marginal products. To probe the robustness of the results based on the PSID, we thus
re-estimate some of the key models using the NLSY (National Longitudinal Survey of Youth). The main
advantage of the NLSY is that it asks workers directly whether or not their earnings are based on
performance, bonuses, or commissions. This is arguably a better measure of performance pay than what is
available in the PSID. Unfortunately, the question about performance pay in the NLSY was only included
in the late 1980s and late 1990s. Combined with the fact that the NLSY only follows a narrow cohort of
individuals over time, it is not possible to use the NLSY to look at the broad-based impact of performance
pay on economic performance.
4.1 The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (1976-1998)
The PSID sample we use consists of male heads of households aged 18 to 65 with average hourly earnings
between $1.00 and $100.00 (in $79) for the period spanning the years 1976-1998, where the hourly wage
rate is obtained by dividing total earnings in the previous year by hours of work.1 Individuals in the public
sector or who are self-employed are excluded from the analysis. This leaves us with a total sample of 32,514
observations for 3,244 workers. Summary statistics are reported in Table 1 and will be discussed below.
4.1.1 Measurement Issues
Identifying performance pay In the PSID, we construct a performance pay indicator variable by
looking at whether part of a worker￿ s total compensation includes a variable pay component (either a
bonus, a commission, or a piece rate). For interview years 1976-1992, we are able to determine whether a
worker received a bonus or a commission over the previous calendar year through the use of multiple
questions. First, workers are asked the amount of money they received from either working overtime, from
commissions, or from bonuses paid by the employer.2 Second, we know whether workers worked overtime,
and if they are working overtime in a given year, we classify them as not having a variable pay
component.3 Third, workers not paid exclusively by the hour or not exclusively by a salary are asked how
they are paid: they can report being paid commissions, piece rates, etc., as well as combinations of
salaried/hourly pay with either pieces rates or commissions.4 Through this combination of questions, we
are thus able to identify all non-overtime workers who received performance pay in the form of either a
bonus, a commission, or a piece rate. Starting with interview year 1993, there are separate questions on the
1In the PSID, data on hours worked during year t, as well as on total labor earnings, bonuses/commissions/overtime income,
and overtime hours, are asked interview year t+1. Thus we actually use data covering interview years 1976-1999.
2Note that the question refers speci￿cally to any amounts earned from bonuses, overtime, or commissions in addition to
wages and salaries earned.
3In some years overtime hours are reported while in other years we only know whether they worked overtime or not.
4In many survey years workers are not asked if their compensation package involves a mixture of salary/hourly pay and
a variable component. All they are asked is how they are paid if not by the hour or a salary. Although there is no way to
directly verify it, this likely results in understating the incidence of either form of variable pay because workers are not allowed
to answer that they are paid, say, a salary, and then report a commission: they have to choose. Our assertion that it likely
understates the extent of variable pay is motivated in part by the fact that workers in the NLSY, to be described below, are
not restricted in describing the way they are paid, and workers in the NLSY are more likely to report having part of their
compensation package containing a variable pay component.
7amounts earned in bonuses, commissions, tips, and overtime work over the previous calendar year. Thus
there is no need to back out an estimate of bonuses from an aggregate amount since the question is asked
directly. For the sake of comparability with the pre-1993 years, we nevertheless classify as receiving no
variable pay all workers who report any overtime work. Thus for each year of the employment relationship
we are able to determine whether the worker￿ s total compensation included a variable pay component. One
obvious drawback is that it is likely the variable pay component we construct will be noisy. However, due
to our treatment of overtime workers, we conservatively lean on the side of misclassifying workers as
receiving no variable pay, even if they do.
De￿ning performance pay jobs One of the main goals of this paper is to see whether employment
relationships that involve performance are systematically di⁄erent from those in which no such
performance pay is ever received. Thus we de￿ne performance pay jobs as employment relationships in
which part of the worker￿ s total compensation includes a variable pay component (either a bonus, a
commission, or a piece rate) at least once during the course of the relationship.5 In some sense, we are not
so much interested in what happens within an employment relationship at the time some performance pay
such as a bonus is received, as to what is the di⁄erence between one type of job and the other.6 Two
related measurement issues arise. The ￿rst one is a simple measurement error issue. On the one hand, we
are likely to misclassify performance pay jobs as non performance pay jobs if some employment
relationships are terminated before performance pay is received. This would be particularly problematic if
the ￿rst receipt of performance pay, which identi￿es the job as a performance pay job, tends to occur later
instead of sooner in the course of the employment relationship. On the other hand, some of the jobs may
be wrongly classi￿ed as performance pay jobs. While it is a priori di¢ cult to assess which of the false
positive or false negative problems are more important, their consequence is the same: assuming there is a
genuine di⁄erence between the two types of jobs, misclassi￿cation will tend to attenuate such di⁄erences.7
The second related issue is an ￿end point￿problem: given our de￿nition of performance pay jobs, we may
mechanically understate the fraction of workers in such jobs at the start of our sample period because most
employment relationships started before 1976. Similarly, jobs which started toward the end of the sample
period may be performance pay jobs but are classi￿ed otherwise because they have not lasted long enough
for performance pay to be observed. The basic measurement problem is that, conditional on job duration,
we tend to observe a given job match fewer times at the two ends of our sample period than in the middle
of the sample period. Consider, for example, the case of a job that lasts for ￿ve year. For jobs that last
from 1985 to 1989, all ￿ve observations on this job match are captured in our PSID sample. For jobs that
last from 1973 to 1977, however, only two of the ￿ve years of the job match are captured in our PSID
5To avoid confusion, note that we use "jobs", "employment relationship", and
"job match" interchangeably. Although in most of the survey years spanning the sample period, the PSID does have
information on tenure in the position, we are not using it. As is well known, simply determining employer tenure in the PSID
can be problematic (Brown and Light (1992))
6That being said, we also look at the within job impacts using an alternative de￿nition of a performance pay job. More on
that below.
7See Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2006) for simple measurement model where we describe the conditions under which
our observed performance pay job indicator is informative.
8sample, which mechanically reduces the probability of classifying the job as performance pay.
The source of the ￿end point￿problem is thus that it results in an unbalanced distribution of the number
of observed job match observations at di⁄erent point of the sample period. One simple solution to the
problem is to ￿rebalance￿the sample using regression or other methods. In practice, what we do is to
create a variable counting the number of job matches observed for each job (as opposed to the actual job
duration), and then add this variable as an additional control in the regression models. Similarly, the
corrected incidence of performance pay over time can be computed by running a linear probability model
(or a logit) in which year dummies and the number of times the job-match is observed are included as
regressors. The year dummies then capture the corrected incidence of pay for performance job. All the
graphs of the incidence of pay for performance reported below are adjusted using this procedure.8
4.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 compares the sample characteristics of workers on performance pay and non-performance pay jobs,
respectively. First notice that over 35 percent of the 32,514 observations are in performance pay jobs,
though these raw ￿gures must be interpreted with caution because of the end-point problem discussed
earlier. Workers on performance pay jobs tend to earn more and be more educated than workers on
non-performance pay jobs. Note that the hourly wage rate includes both regular wage and salary earnings
and performance pay in the case of workers on performance pay jobs. Annual hours worked and employer
tenure also tends to be higher for workers on performance pay than non-performance pay jobs. Not
surprisingly, the unionization rate (percent covered by collective bargaining agreements) is much lower
among performance pay workers, suggesting that, as expected, pay structure in union ￿rms tend to have
wages attached to jobs instead of workers. Another important di⁄erence is that there is a much higher
fraction of workers paid by the hour in non-performance than performance pay jobs. On the ￿ ip side,
workers on performance pay jobs are much more likely to be salaried workers than those on
non-performance pay jobs. However, perhaps the most striking feature of Table 1 is the di⁄erence in the
fraction of individuals reporting that they are unemployed at the time of the interview across both types of
jobs. Only 1.7% of those whose current or more recent job had performance pay are unemployed.
Naturally, this is only descriptive and it could be that workers in performance pay jobs are ￿special￿
relative to other workers. The fact that they are more skilled is certainly indicative of selectivity.
Figure 1 shows that the overall incidence of performance pay jobs has increased steadily since the early
1980￿ s. It is also true that the incidence of performance pay in any given year increased as well. Figure 1
also shows the fraction of workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Remarkably, the line
showing the fraction of unionized workers is almost the mirror image of the bonus pay job incidence line.
However, as we discuss in more details in our companion paper Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2006), the
incidence of performance pay jobs increased most markedly in salaried (as opposed to hourly paid) jobs, in
8Note that the PSID became a bi-annual survey after 1996. This poses a problem in aligning job information (tenure,
industry, etc.) which relate to the job held at the interview to the earnings information, including bonus amounts, which is for
the calendar year before the interview.
9which union coverage rates were fairly stable (and low) over the sample period. Hence the increase in
performance pay job incidence is not just a simple de-unionization story. One might argue that increases in
education have increased the bene￿t from performance pay due to selection, however the upward trends
remains even after controlling for education. Hence, this rise in performance pay incidence is consistent
with the hypothesis that technical change has lowered the cost of implementing a performance pay system.
In Figure 2 we show kernel densities of the distribution of annual hours worked in both types of jobs. We
can see that the distribution of hours worked in performance pay jobs is to the right of the one for workers
in other jobs, with a greater fraction of people working over 2000 hours per year. The distribution of hours
worked for performance pay workers merely con￿rms that what we report in Table 1 in terms of sample
means is an accurate description of what happens to hours worked over the whole distribution. Next in
Figure 3 we show the distribution of the share of performance pay in total labor earnings. To compute the
share we use the amounts directly reported by respondents over the 1992-1998 period for the amounts
earned in commission, bonuses, and tips.9 Given that the median share is about 3.5% of total earnings, it
would appear that whatever makes performance pay jobs di⁄erent than other jobs, the variable pay
component itself is likely not to be the only element making them di⁄erent, as opposed to the overall total
compensation.
Finally, in Figure 4 we plot the Kaplan-Meier survivor function for both types of jobs. We see that, as
reported in Table 1 for mean tenure levels, performance pay jobs are associated with longer lasting
employment relationships. While this may not re￿ ect only the e⁄ect of working in a performance pay job,
as workers of di⁄erent types might systematically select themselves into such jobs, we will see below that
the visual impression made by Figure 4 is left unchanged when we perform a multivariate duration analysis
which accounts for unmeasured worker heterogeneity.10
5 Results
5.1 Performance Pay, Earnings, and Hours Worked
In Panel A of Table 2 we report the estimates obtained from a regression of log hourly earnings on a
performance pay job dummy as well as on a dummy for having part of the current year￿ s pay based on job
performance. The results are shown for both the sample of employed workers at the time of the interview
and the sample of all workers, employed and unemployed, with positive earnings at interview time. As we
move from columns [1] to [2] and [4] to [5], it is fairly clear that the selection of workers with better
productive characteristics is a major factor explaining the di⁄erences in wages across types of jobs. In fact,
all of the wage premia associated with performance pay jobs go away once we control for unmeasured
workers characteristics. Still, as we can see in columns [3] and [6], the e⁄ect of having received some form
9Note that it also possible to back out an estimate of bonus amounts earned in pre-1992 data by using the set of questions
on amounts earned in overtime, bonuses, or commissions and the questions on overtime work and pay method. Turning to
￿missing￿all observations in which respondents either worked overtime of report commissions earnings, we get an estimate of
bonuses earned. The resulting distribution of the share of bonuses earned is very similar to the one shown on Figure 3.
10This, of course, does not control for the fact that job-match heterogeneity, as opposed to worker heterogeneity, is possibly
the reason for lower hazard rates out of performance pay jobs.
10of performance pay in the current year is positive, even after we control for worker-employer ￿xed-e⁄ects.
This is consistent with the model where all the addition compensation over the base wage occurs when
high performance is observed. The additional compensation rewards the worker from her increased e⁄ort.11
Next in Panel B we show the impact of performance pay on annual hours worked. We can see that even
when we control for worker ￿xed e⁄ects the visual impression suggested by Figure 2 is left unchanged.
Workers in performance pay jobs do seem to work more hours. Interestingly, though, once we control for
employer-employee ￿xed-e⁄ects, the evidence is much weaker. At ￿rst glance it would suggest that
year-to-year variations induced by having a performance pay component contributing to the current year￿ s
pay are small. In other words, it seems that workers in performance pay jobs work more throughout the
employment relationship, not just when they have some form of performance in a given year. Finally, the
results in Panel C represent a combination of those in Panels A and B. Controlling for worker ￿xed-e⁄ects,
there is some evidence that workers earn more in performance pay jobs, as we can see in columns [2] and
[5]. This is not surprising given the zero e⁄ect on hourly wages and the positive e⁄ect on hours worked. We
also ￿nd within employer e⁄ects which are fairly similar to those in Panel A.
5.2 The E⁄ect of Local Labor Market Conditions
In Table 3 we explore the way in which worker compensation in performance and non performance pay jobs
varies with the conditions of the local labor market. This is measured using the unemployment rate in the
county of residence. To allow for separate e⁄ects of the regressors we interact each of them with the
performance pay dummy indicator in all the regressions underlying the results reported in Table 3. As in
Table 2 the results are reported for the employed only as well as for all employed and unemployed workers
with positive earnings
Looking ￿rst at Panel A we can see in columns [1] and [2] as well as columns [4] and [5] that controlling for
worker ￿xed-e⁄ects results in increasing the impact of the local unemployment rate (in both types of jobs)
on log hourly earnings.12 More importantly, though, the impact of local conditions is greater in
performance pay jobs. There is even evidence that wages respond to outside conditions within employment
relationships. That implies that the e⁄ect of local conditions on log wage in performance pay jobs is not
only generated by workers switching employers, but that some of the impact comes from worker￿ s wages
being adjusted from year to year by their employers, depending on the conditions of the market. We can
see that, at least when we control for worker ￿xed-e⁄ects, the hypothesis that the impact of the local
unemployment rate is the same in both types of jobs is decidedly rejected. The test is less conclusive when
we control for worker-￿rm ￿xed-e⁄ects.
Moving to Panel B, the conclusion is basically the opposite compared to the results on wages reported in
Panel A. Hours are now more responsive to local labor market conditions in non performance jobs.
11It does not necessarily follows that having part of the current year￿ s compensation based on performance pay results in an
increase in hourly pay. If the ￿base￿salary component is partly replaced by a performance pay component, total compensation
could be left unchanged. The evidence presented in column [3] of Table 2 suggests that performance pay does not simply
displace base pay.
12See Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) for evidence that compositional e⁄ects tend to understate the extent of real wage
cyclicality in OLS regressions.
11Additionally, all tests of equality in the e⁄ect of the local unemployment rate have p-values below 5%. We
interpret the evidence reported in Panels A and B as strongly suggestive that when ￿rms cannot adjust
wages so that they better re￿ ect the worker productivity, they adjust at the hours margin, consistent with
the evidence Card (1986) ￿nds using data on airline mechanics. Conversely when wages are ￿ exible relative
to the state of the labor market, we ￿nd that hours worked do not change much in response to changes in
those conditions. In fact, in Panel B we ￿nd no evidence that hours worked in performance pay jobs are
in￿ uenced by local labor market conditions.
Finally, in Panel C of Table 3 we report the results when we change the dependent variable to be the log of
total annual earnings. Interestingly, we ￿nd little evidence that total earnings are in￿ uenced by local labor
conditions di⁄erently in performance relative to non performance pay jobs. Except perhaps in column [1],
all p-values are suggestive that total earnings respond the same way to the state of the local labor market:
some ￿rms, the ones in which workers have some performance pay component, adjust wages while the
others adjust hours worked. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the labor market is competitive,
with workers earning the same expected utility is both types of jobs.
5.3 Hazard Model Estimates
The results presented in Table 3 indicate that workers in performance pay jobs are better shielded from
market ￿ uctuations when it comes to hours worked. We would also like to know whether employers adjust
at the extensive margin, that is whether workers in performance pay jobs are less likely to be laid o⁄. The
Kaplan-Meier estimates plotted in Figure 4 are indicative that employment relationships are more stable in
performance pay jobs than in other jobs. What we do here is to check whether this visual impression is
robust to the inclusion of controls for worker characteristics.
We estimate a so-called ￿grouped-data￿ -or discrete-hazard model which allows for time-varying covariates.
Essentially, such a model accounts for the fact that while the underlying process generating employment
duration is continuous, the data is not recorded in continuous format. To incorporate time varying
covariates we follow Jenkins (1995) and ￿split￿employment spells into yearly observations. Covariates are
thus allowed to vary across those observations but they are considered ￿xed within them. Finally we allow
for a ￿ exible (piece-wise constant) baseline hazard as well as unmeasured worker heterogeneity modeled as
a Gamma distribution, following (Meyer (1990)).
The results are reported in Table 4 in hazard ratio format. We can see that whether we control for
unobserved heterogeneity or not, the qualitative conclusion is basically left unchanged: workers in
performance pay jobs are much less likely to see the employment relationship being terminated than
workers in other jobs. In fact, correcting for worker unobserved heterogeneity only results in decreasing the
hazard ratio.
Combining the results in Table 4 with those in Table 3 where we show that hours are much more
responsive to local labor market conditions in non performance pay jobs, we conclude that the evidence is
strongly suggestive that employment relationships are more durable in performance pay jobs, even after
controlling for unmeasured workers characteristics. In other words, the results are not supportive of a
simple selection story by which more productive workers who are selected into performance pay jobs also
12happen to be ￿low-mobility types￿ .
5.4 Unemployment at the Time of the Interview and Performance Pay Jobs
Another way to check whether workers are better shielded from unemployment risks in performance pay is
to estimate a model in which the dependent variable is simply a dummy indicator for being unemployed at
the time of the interview. One possible advantage of doing so is that it allows us to check the robustness of
our results to various parametric assumptions in perhaps a more convincing way than is the case in the
hazard model.
The results are reported in Table 5. We use various speci￿cations, including panel data methods. Looking
￿rst at columns [1] to [4], we can see that the simple probit results are sensitive to the inclusion of sectorial
controls. While in column [1] the estimate shows that being in a pay for performance job reduces the
probability of being unemployed by over 3 percentage points, adding industry and occupations controls
results in reducing this estimate to less than 1 percentage point. What this suggests is that whether one is
in a performance pay job depends to a great extent on the sector in which he works. This is consistent with
the view that job characteristics are likely to be an important determinant of compensation, as is suggested
in MacLeod and Parent (1999).
If we look at the panel estimates reported in columns [5] and [6], it would appear that controlling for
worker unmeasured characteristics actually increases the impact of being in a performance pay job.
However, we are somewhat skeptical about the magnitude of the coe¢ cients, at least in the case of the
￿xed-e⁄ect linear regression. While using a linear model allows to absorb worker ￿xed-e⁄ects, the fact that
little more than 5% of the sample is unemployed at the time of the interview is problematic for the linear
probability model.13 More fundamentally, it would seem unrealistic to think that we could basically reduce
the unemployment rate to close to zero if ￿rms adopted performance pay schemes. The fact that many of
them have not done so would indicate that they may not be able to do so.
In sum, the evidence reported in Tables 3-5 is strongly consistent with the notion that when ￿rms can
adjust compensation so that it better re￿ ects worker productivity, layo⁄ risks are considerably reduced. In
short, performance pay is e¢ ciency enhancing.
5.5 Performance Pay and Annual Earnings Inequality
One of our main results is that ￿rms using performance pay do not adjust hours worked in response to
business cycle variations, while ￿rms using non performance pay do. Although performance pay allows for
a closer connection between worker productivity and compensation, which results in increased hourly wage
inequality in performance pay jobs (Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2006)), it does not necessarily follow
that total compensation need be more unequal in performance pay jobs relative to other jobs.
To check whether annual earnings are more unequal in performance pay jobs, we show in Figure 5 the
evolution of total earnings inequality, as measured by its standard deviation, over the sample period. We
13As is well known, the cumulative normal distribution function is roughly linear over a fairly wide range around the median,
which means that using a linear model or a probit should not make such a large di⁄erence. However, things are di⁄erent in the
tails.
13can see in Panel A, where we use only the subsample of workers who are employed at the time of the
interview, that inequality in performance pay jobs is very similar to what it is in non performance pay jobs.
There is simply no evidence in Panel A that annual earnings are more unequally distributed in performance
pay jobs. If we look at the ￿gure in Panel B where we use all workers, employed and unemployed, with
positive earnings inequality in total earnings is actually substantially smaller in performance pay jobs.
While the contrast between the ￿gures in Panel A and Panel B is striking, given the ￿gure in Panel A, what
we see in Panel B is actually what we should expect given our earlier result on hours worked. Workers in
performance pay work more hours during the year and face a lower layo⁄ risk. Thus it is not surprising
that their annual compensation is subject to less variation relative to workers in non performance pay jobs.
6 Conclusion
A substantial fraction of workers in the U.S. are paid some form of performance pay, a fraction that has
increased substantially from the late 70￿ s to the late 90￿ s. We ￿nd that workers in performance pay jobs
earn more and work a greater number of hours, than workers in ￿xed wage jobs. Moreover, the average
hourly earnings of workers whose pay is partly based on performance are more sensitive to variations in the
local unemployment rate than is the case for workers in non performance pay jobs.
At the same time, we ￿nd that hours worked are more responsive to local labor market conditions in
non-performance pay jobs and that the responsiveness of total earnings is roughly the same in both types
of jobs, at least in the PSID data. We then show that the hazard out of employment is considerably lower
in performance pay jobs than in other jobs, even after controlling for worker unmeasured characteristics.
Next we study the relationship between being unemployed at the time of the interview and whether the
worker is in a performance pay job if he is still employed or was in such a job if he is unemployed. Not
surprisingly, given our hazard model results, we ￿nd a negative impact which we interpret as providing
evidence that when ￿rms can adjust pay so that it better re￿ ects productivity, workers are less exposed to
lay o⁄ risks. Again this result is obtained controlling for worker unmeasured characteristics. This means
that our ￿ndings are not simply the results of di⁄erent types of workers in performance pay jobs relative to
those working in non-performance pay jobs. While we ￿nd strong evidence that workers in performance
pay jobs are positively selected, our results suggest that workers moving into performance pay jobs would
be less likely to face layo⁄ risks at the cost of being exposed to a more variable pay. Finally we show that
while hourly earnings inequality is greater among workers in performance pay jobs, total earnings
inequality is actually smaller due to the fact that those who are in performance pay jobs are less likely to
be unemployed and thus accumulate more hours over the course of year.
Even though this results are at the individual level, they provide some empirical support for the claims of
Weitzman (1983) who argued that pro￿t sharing plans would reduce employment ￿ uctuations and increase
employee welfare.14 What we cannot address is the question of why more ￿rms do not adopt performance
pay systems. Given that the use of performance pay is increasing over time, this is consistent with the
hypothesis that performance pay systems are costly to implement, as suggested by Brown (1990), and that
14See also the recent work of Oyer (2004).
14these costs relative to their bene￿ts are decreasing over time.
If future research supports this hypothesis, this would imply that popular theories of wage formation used
in macro-economics need to be carefully reformulated. In particular, our results do not support that
hypothesis that workers enter into insurance contract with ￿rms, as predicted by the implicit contract
theory of Azariadis (1975) and Baily (1974). Workers on standard wage contracts appear to face more risk
and lower incomes that workers on performance pay contracts. However, as the management literature has
repeatedly observed, the creation of a successful performance pay is system is a di¢ cult and complex
task.15 More work is needed to understand the relationship between these complex systems and over all
economic performance.
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Figure 4. Kaplan−Meier Survivor Function
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Figure 5. Total Log Earnings Inequality
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